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August 4, 2025

Updated: November 5, 2026

Ransomware Payout Statistics 2026: Trends & Costs

Why total ransomware payments keep falling while the typical victim who pays is handing over more.

Mohammed Khalil

Mohammed Khalil

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Ransomware Economy

Navigating the Paradox of the 2026 Ransomware Economy

The question on every business leader's and security professional's mind in 2026 is no longer if they will face a ransomware threat, but what that threat will look like and what it will cost. The statistics on ransomware payouts paint a complex and often contradictory picture. On one hand, the total amount of money flowing to cybercriminals fell sharply in 2024 and dropped again in 2025. On the other, the typical victim who feels forced to pay is handing over more. This report unpacks that paradox.

This report complements broader cybersecurity statistics with a strategic analysis of the forces reshaping the ransomware battlefield. We'll dissect the global payment trends, explore why some industries are paying multi million dollar ransoms while others hold the line, and examine the fallout from law enforcement's unprecedented success in disrupting the world's most notorious ransomware gangs.

For victim counts, attack volumes and recovery costs beyond ransom payments, see our main ransomware statistics guide.

Understanding these dynamics is critical right now because the adversary has evolved. The era of monolithic ransomware as a service (RaaS) empires is giving way to a more fragmented, unpredictable ecosystem. Attackers are shifting from purely technical exploits to sophisticated social engineering, targeting the human element with chilling precision. They are no longer just encrypting data; they are weaponizing it through double, triple, and even quadruple extortion tactics designed to maximize business disruption and force a payment.

This report provides the definitive ransomware payout statistics for 2025-2026, offering the data driven context you need to build a resilient defense against the threats of today and tomorrow.

Ransomware Payouts in 2026: The Key Stats at a Glance

For those who need the bottom line upfront, here are the most critical ransomware payout statistics shaping the current landscape:

Ransomware Payout Trends (2023–2026): The Rise and Fall

The top line figures of the ransomware economy tell a story of extreme volatility. After a landmark year in 2023 where payouts breached the billion dollar threshold for the first time, 2024 saw a dramatic reversal and 2025 a further decline. However, these aggregate numbers conceal the granular trends that reveal the true nature of the modern ransomware threat: a shrinking overall market where the stakes for individual, high value targets remain dangerously high.

Total Ransom Paid Globally: A Tumultuous Year Over Year Analysis

The ransomware economy experienced a significant contraction in 2024 after reaching an unprecedented peak the year before. In 2023, total global payments made by victims to ransomware gangs soared to an estimated $1.25 billion according to Chainalysis, a record breaking figure that marked the first time the billion dollar line had been crossed. This surge was not an anomaly but the culmination of several powerful trends, most notably the success of hyper prolific supply chain attacks like the one orchestrated by the Cl0p gang against the MOVEit file transfer service, which compromised data from thousands of organizations in a single campaign.

However, 2024 witnessed a sharp downturn. According to blockchain analysis from firms like Chainalysis, total payments fell by approximately 35% to around $813.6 million (Chainalysis has since revised its 2024 estimate up to $892 million as more payments were identified). This decline was not a steady slide but a tale of two halves. The first half of 2024 was on track to surpass 2023's record, with payments reaching nearly $460 million by June. The drop was concentrated in the second half of the year, a direct consequence of escalating pressure from law enforcement and a fundamental shift in victim behavior.

In 2025, the decline continued at a gentler pace. Chainalysis's 2026 ransomware analysis estimates victims paid more than $820 million, about 8% below the revised 2024 figure, while the share of victims paying fell to an estimated 28%, a potential all-time low. At the same time, claimed victims on leak sites rose about 50% year over year, showing that attack volume and attacker revenue have decoupled.

This up and down pattern, a dip in 2022 often attributed to the disruption of Russian speaking gangs like Conti following the invasion of Ukraine, a massive rebound in 2023, and a sharp fall in late 2024 highlights the fragile and reactive nature of the cybercrime landscape. The 2024 decline was not driven by a decrease in attacks; in fact, the number of publicly reported ransomware incidents reached an all time high that year. Instead, the fall in revenue points to a disruption in the attackers' business model. The two primary drivers, which we'll explore in greater detail, were aggressive and coordinated international law enforcement operations that dismantled top tier gangs and a growing, hardened resolve among victims who are now better equipped and more willing to recover without paying the ransom. The result is a criminal market in flux, where launching attacks is still easy, but successfully monetizing them has become significantly harder.

What is the Average Ransomware Payment in 2026?

Beneath the surface of the shrinking global payout total lies a critical and alarming trend: the cost for an organization that does pay a ransom has exploded. This divergence is best understood by comparing the average and median payment amounts, which reveals datasets that move in different directions depending on who is measured.

Survey data from Sophos shows how volatile payment sizes have been. Its 2024 report found the median ransom payment jumped fivefold, from about $400,000 to $2 million, with 63% of ransom demands at $1 million or more. The 2025 edition put the median payment at $1 million, and the 2026 edition at $769,000, with the median demand down to $698,000. Outliers still distort averages: a record $75 million payment to the Dark Angels group in 2024, cited by Chainalysis, can dramatically pull up the mean on its own.

The median ransom payment, which represents the typical "middle of the road" victim experience and is less affected by extreme outliers, tells a more nuanced story. Chainalysis estimates the median ransom paid was $59,556 in 2025, up 368% from $12,738 in 2024, while Verizon's 2026 DBIR puts the median at $139,875, down from $150,000. Data from incident response firm Coveware, whose clients tend to be larger, shows significant quarter to quarter volatility: the median fell to $110,890 in Q4 2024, rose to $325,000 in Q4 2025, dropped to $150,000 in Q2 2026 and climbed to $400,000 in Q3 2026. Coveware's average payment swung from $1,880,612 in Q2 2026 to $1,025,278 in Q3 2026.

One possible explanation for the gap between average and median figures is a bifurcated ransomware market, although none of the cited sources attributes the change to a single cause. In this reading, a small number of very large payments pulls the "average" upward, while the "median" reflects the more common, yet still costly, experience of a typical paying victim. The fragmentation of the RaaS ecosystem may also play a role. With large, efficient syndicates like LockBit disrupted, highly skilled affiliates are now operating more independently, and some may focus on targets where the potential payout justifies the effort and risk.

It's also crucial to note that the initial demand is rarely the final price. Victims have become more adept at negotiation. Sophos's 2025 survey found that 53% of victims paid less than the initial demand (29% matched it and 18% paid more), and 51% of paying organizations negotiated a lower amount in its 2026 survey. Chainalysis notes that the gap between the amount demanded and the amount paid grew to 53% in the second half of 2024.

Who Pays the Ransom? Payment Rates and Backup Recovery Trends

The decision to pay a ransom is one of the most difficult a leadership team can face. It's a complex calculation involving operational downtime, financial cost, reputational damage, and ethical considerations. In recent years, a clear trend has emerged: while the pressure tactics from attackers have intensified, victim resilience has grown even faster, leading to a historic shift in who pays and why.

The Tipping Point: Why a Record Number of Victims Are Refusing to Pay

The single most optimistic trend in the fight against ransomware is the growing refusal of victims to pay. This isn't based on hope, but on hard data from incident response firms on the front lines. Coveware reported that the share of victims who paid fell to 25% in Q4 2024, then to 23% in Q3 2025 and a then-record low of about 20% in Q4 2025; Coveware reported a further record low in Q2 2026. In Q3 2026, Coveware said nearly 80% of incidents were resolved without a ransom payment, and Chainalysis estimates only about 28% of victims paid across 2025. This means roughly three to four out of every five organizations resolved the incident without paying. This represents a sea change from just a few years ago when payment rates were often above 50%.

This trend is not an accident; it is the result of three powerful forces converging:

  1. Improved Backup and Recovery: The single most important factor driving non payment is the successful implementation of robust backup strategies. Organizations have heeded the warnings and invested heavily in creating resilient, segregated, and tested backups. When a company is confident it can restore its critical systems and data, the attacker's primary leverage operational paralysis is neutralized.
  2. Erosion of Trust in the "Criminal Business Model": Attackers often try to present themselves as pragmatic "business partners," promising a smooth recovery in exchange for payment. This illusion has been shattered. High profile cases where attackers leaked data anyway after receiving a ransom have taught victims that there is no honor among thieves. Furthermore, the spectacular implosion of the ALPHV/BlackCat gang, which performed an "exit scam" by stealing ransom funds from its own affiliates, broadcast a clear message throughout the underworld and to victims: the RaaS ecosystem is unstable and its promises are worthless.
  3. Consistent Government and Law Enforcement Guidance: For years, agencies like the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have unequivocally advised victims not to pay ransoms. This consistent messaging, coupled with the legal risks associated with paying sanctioned entities, has empowered leadership teams to stand firm and explore other recovery options.

This decline in the payment rate is the most significant existential threat to the ransomware business model. Ransomware is a crime of profit, calculated on a simple ROI. When the "conversion rate" , the percentage of attacks that result in a payout plummets, the entire economic model begins to fail. It forces attackers to work exponentially harder for each dollar, creating a powerful market driven deterrent.

Myth vs Fact: Do Backups Make You Ransom Proof?

Visual showing overlap: 68% used backups, 56% paid a ransom, 47% used both methods.

Here’s the deal: while robust backups are the cornerstone of ransomware resilience, the idea that they are a complete silver bullet is a dangerous myth in the modern threat landscape. The evolution of attacker tactics, specifically the rise of "double extortion," has complicated the recovery calculus for many victims.

The rates differ partly because they measure different populations: Coveware reports the share of its incident-response cases that paid (about 20% in Q4 2025), Chainalysis estimates payments against leak-site victims (about 28% in 2025), and Sophos reports the share of surveyed organizations with encrypted data that paid (49% in 2025 and 48% in 2026).

Data exfiltration adds a second source of pressure. Modern ransomware attacks are rarely just about encryption anymore. The standard playbook now involves a preliminary step where attackers silently steal massive volumes of sensitive data before they deploy the ransomware to encrypt systems. This creates a second layer of extortion: even if the victim can restore their operations from backups, the attackers still hold their most sensitive data hostage, threatening to leak it publicly on the dark web.

This tactic is incredibly effective. The Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report found that ransomware was a component in 44% of all data breaches in its 2025 edition, up from 32%, and 48% in 2026, highlighting how intertwined encryption and data theft have become. This leads to what is now a common "hybrid response" scenario. An organization may use its backups to restore servers and get the business running again, but it will simultaneously negotiate and pay a ransom, often a smaller amount, solely to receive a "promise" that the stolen data will be deleted. Sophos's 2024 data clearly illustrates this overlap: while 68% of organizations restored data from backups, 56% still ended up paying a ransom, and 47% of victims used multiple recovery methods. In its 2026 survey, 66% restored encrypted data from backups and 48% paid.

This dynamic explains why the payment rate for pure data extortion attacks (where no encryption occurs) can be higher than for traditional ransomware attacks; Coveware put it at about 25% in Q4 2025, above the overall rate of about 20%. When backups are irrelevant to the threat, the attacker's leverage is purely about the sensitivity of the stolen data and the victim's fear of reputational damage, regulatory fines, and customer lawsuits. This highlights why proactive measures like a robust vulnerability assessment vs penetration testing program are critical to prevent initial access in the first place.

Ransomware Payment Statistics by Industry

Ransomware is not a monolithic threat; it impacts different industries in vastly different ways. Attackers tailor their targets and tactics based on a sector's operational pressures, regulatory environment, and perceived ability to pay. The following analysis breaks down the unique challenges and payment trends across key industries, revealing a diverse battlefield where the cost of an attack is measured not just in dollars, but in public safety, economic stability, and institutional trust.

Healthcare: Under Siege and Under Pressure

The healthcare sector remains one of the most embattled fronts in the war on ransomware. Attackers target hospitals and providers with the cynical understanding that the life or death urgency to restore patient care creates immense pressure to pay. Healthcare was the second most common victim industry in Coveware's Q4 2025 caseload (15.3%) and the most common in Q1 2026 (17.6%).

The latest data shows a sector regaining some ground. In the Sophos State of Ransomware in Healthcare 2025 report, only 34% of attacks resulted in data encryption, down from 74% the year before, and 36% of providers paid the ransom. The median payment fell to $150,000 from $1.47 million in 2024, the lowest of any sector, and median demands plunged 91% to $343,000. Mean recovery costs, excluding ransoms, fell 60% to $1.02 million. The weak spot is backups: their use to restore encrypted data fell to 51% from 72%.

The catastrophic Change Healthcare attack in February 2024 serves as a defining case study for the entire industry. Attackers from the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware group gained access through a Citrix remote access portal that tragically lacked multi factor authentication (MFA). The resulting system wide encryption paralyzed the U.S. healthcare payment infrastructure, disrupting pharmacies, hospitals, and clinics nationwide. UnitedHealth Group, Change's parent company, ultimately confirmed it paid a $22 million ransom. In a devastating twist that underscores the futility of trusting criminals, a second ransomware group later emerged, claiming to possess the same stolen data and demanding another payment. UnitedHealth Group put the total 2024 financial impact at nearly $2.9 billion in its October 2024 update, a figure that includes response and business disruption costs and dwarfs the ransom itself. For providers, validating defenses against these tactics is non negotiable, making a HIPAA penetration testing checklist an essential part of their risk management strategy.

Financial Services: Strong Defenses, High Stakes

The financial services sector presents a paradox for attackers. On one hand, it is a bastion of mature security programs and robust defenses. On the other, the sheer value of its data and the critical importance of maintaining customer trust mean that when an attack does succeed, the stakes are astronomical.

The sector's defensive strength has historically been evident in the data. In Sophos's 2024 survey, only 49% of ransomware attacks on financial firms resulted in data encryption. That advantage is eroding: in the 2025 financial services report, encryption rose to 59%, the sector's second highest level in five years, and the share of attacks stopped before encryption fell to 38%.

However, when extortionists do gain leverage, financial firms are often willing to pay to mitigate the damage. 67% of financial services victims paid a ransom in Sophos's 2025 survey, the highest rate recorded that year. These payouts are among the highest of any sector, with a median payment of $2.1 million (up 5% from $2 million) against a median demand of $3 million, the highest across all industries surveyed. This reflects the high value of the data at risk and the catastrophic potential of a major data leak. These firms still negotiate: 48% paid less than the initial ask, 31% matched it and 21% paid more. For these organizations, adhering to stringent security frameworks is paramount, and validating compliance through assessments like those outlined in the PCI DSS penetration testing guide is a routine part of their defense in depth strategy.

Manufacturing & Production: The New Front Line

The manufacturing and production sector has rapidly become a top target for ransomware gangs, who have identified its operational model as uniquely vulnerable to extortion. The industry's reliance on just in time production, complex operational technology (OT) environments, and interconnected supply chains means that any downtime can have immediate and cascading financial consequences.

This vulnerability is reflected in the statistics. In the Sophos State of Ransomware in Manufacturing and Production 2025 report, based on 332 organizations, only 40% of attacks resulted in data encryption (down from 74% in 2024), yet 51% of victims still paid the ransom, well above the 33% and 34% seen in the 2022 and 2023 surveys. That indicates attackers' pressure tactics remain highly effective in this sector.

The average payment in manufacturing was $1.0 million, down from $1.2 million in 2024, and mean recovery costs excluding ransoms fell to $1.3 million from $1.7 million. The high payment rate persists even though 58% of victims used backups. This suggests that the pressure to avoid costly production stoppages and supply chain disruptions is so intense that many firms view paying the ransom as the fastest, albeit most painful, path back to operational normalcy. This makes understanding and mitigating common network vulnerabilities in 2025 a critical priority for the entire sector.

Education: A Soft Target with a Heavy Price

Cybercriminals perceive the education sector from K 12 school districts to large universities as an ideal target: often under resourced in cybersecurity, yet under immense public pressure to maintain operations for students and communities. This combination has led to some of the most shocking ransom payment statistics of any industry. For the wider breach picture behind these payments, see our education sector data breach statistics.

Payouts in this sector have been astronomical but are now falling fast. In Sophos's 2024 data, the median ransom payment was a staggering $6.6 million for K 12 schools and $4.4 million for higher education. The Sophos State of Ransomware in Education 2025 report shows median payments of $800,000 in lower education and $463,000 in higher education. Lower education also had the lowest encryption rate of any sector (29%), while 58% of attacks on higher education resulted in encryption.

Backups remain the sector's weak point. The use of backups to restore encrypted data fell to 59% in lower education (from 75%) and 47% in higher education (from 78%), leaving more institutions with fewer recovery options. Recovery costs remain heavy, even before any ransom is paid: the mean cost to remediate an incident was $2.20 million in lower education (down from $3.76 million) and $0.90 million in higher education (down from $4.02 million).

Government: A Prime Target with a No Pay Policy Dilemma

Government agencies, from local municipalities to federal bodies, are a prime ransomware target. Comparitech logged 374 ransomware attacks on government entities worldwide in 2025, up 27% from 294 in 2024, after a 65% year-over-year rise in the first half (Comparitech's H1 2025 government roundup), when Qilin had the most confirmed attacks on government entities.

The response from this sector, however, is complicated by a growing movement toward policies that ban ransom payments. The UK government has proposed banning public sector bodies and operators of critical national infrastructure from paying ransoms, and some U.S. states have restricted public entities from paying, a strategy aimed at removing the financial incentive for attackers. This makes payout statistics for the government sector difficult to interpret. Sophos's 2025 survey found state and local government reported the highest median payment of any sector, $2.5 million, and in its 2026 survey state and local government had the highest payment rate, 72%.

Where payment bans or policies apply, government entities are forced to absorb massive recovery costs rather than pay. This policy dilemma places an even greater emphasis on resilience and adherence to rigorous security standards, making frameworks like the one for federal contractors critical. For these entities, understanding the requirements of FedRAMP penetration testing is a key component of their defensive strategy.

Top Ransomware Families in 2024–2025

The character of the ransomware threat is defined by the criminals who perpetrate it. The period from 2024 to 2025 will be remembered as a time of unprecedented upheaval in the cybercrime underworld. The dominant, seemingly untouchable empires of the past have crumbled under the weight of global law enforcement action and internal strife, giving rise to a new, more chaotic landscape of smaller, faster, and more diverse adversaries.

The King is Dead: The Fall of LockBit and the Collapse of ALPHV/BlackCat

For years, the ransomware as a service (RaaS) market was dominated by a few major brands that operated like criminal franchises, providing malware, infrastructure, and negotiation platforms to a vast network of affiliates. In early 2024, law enforcement delivered a devastating one two punch that decapitated the two most powerful groups: LockBit and ALPHV/BlackCat.

Operation Cronos, a coordinated international effort led by the U.S. FBI and the U.K.'s National Crime Agency in February 2024, systematically dismantled the LockBit operation. Authorities seized critical infrastructure, made arrests of key developers and affiliates, and, in a significant victory for victims, obtained over 1,000 decryption keys that could be used to restore data without a ransom. The operation didn't stop there; law enforcement maintained pressure on the group throughout the year, degrading its ability to operate and eroding its reputation in the criminal underground.

At around the same time, the ALPHV/BlackCat gang, another market leader, imploded from within. In a stunning act of self sabotage, the gang's administrators executed an "exit scam," shutting down their infrastructure and absconding with millions of dollars in ransom payments that were owed to their own affiliates. This act of betrayal sent shockwaves through the RaaS ecosystem, shattering the fragile trust that underpins the affiliate based business model.

The combined effect of these two events created a massive power vacuum. More importantly, they sowed deep distrust and paranoia among cybercriminals, making it exceedingly difficult for any single new RaaS brand to achieve the scale, efficiency, and "brand loyalty" that LockBit and ALPHV once commanded.

The New Contenders: Who are the Most Active Ransomware Groups?

With the old guard dethroned, the ransomware landscape has fragmented. In place of a few dominant players, there is now a churning, volatile ecosystem of dozens of mid tier groups, rebranded operations, and new entrants all competing for a piece of the market. Coveware's Q4 2025 data illustrates this: Akira (14%), Qilin (13%) and unaffiliated lone wolf actors (12%) led the market, with no single brand dominant, a stark contrast to the days when LockBit alone was responsible for a huge share of incidents.

Several groups have risen to prominence in this new era:

Another significant development is the rise of the "lone wolf" attacker. Following the collapse of major syndicates like Conti and LockBit, many experienced affiliates have chosen to go independent rather than join another RaaS program. Lone wolf actors accounted for 12% of Coveware's Q4 2025 cases, ranking third overall. This further complicates attribution and defense, as defenders face a more diverse array of individual adversaries rather than a few monolithic groups. To gain a broader perspective on the threats these groups pose, it's useful to understand the different malware attack types and infection trends.

Beyond Encryption: The Evolution of Attacker TTPs

Diagram showing phishing → credential theft → ESXi encryption → data exfiltration → triple extortion.

The most sophisticated ransomware actors of 2025 and 2026 are moving beyond purely technical exploits and are increasingly targeting the weakest link in any organization's security chain: its people. While exploiting unpatched software vulnerabilities remains a key entry point, the latest trends show a marked shift toward identity based attacks and advanced social engineering. In Coveware's Q3 2026 cases, phishing and social engineering was the largest initial access vector at about 29%, ahead of remote access compromise (22-23%) and compromised credentials (14-15%).

The playbook of the group known as Scattered Spider (also tracked as UNC3944) epitomizes this evolution. This group specializes in bypassing technical controls by manipulating human trust. Their tactics include:

This focus on identity compromise is a direct response to improved technical defenses. When attackers can't find a vulnerability to exploit, they simply "log in" using stolen credentials. This is why a comprehensive understanding of threats must include not just ransomware, but also the methods used to facilitate it, as detailed in this analysis of phishing attack trends and statistics (2026).

In addition to targeting people, advanced groups are also shifting their focus to core infrastructure. A particularly devastating tactic gaining popularity is the direct targeting of virtualization platforms like VMware's vSphere and ESXi hypervisors. By gaining administrative access to vCenter, attackers can deploy ransomware across dozens or even hundreds of servers simultaneously, causing maximum operational disruption with a single stroke.

Finally, the emergence of generative AI is beginning to act as a force multiplier for criminals. Attackers are using AI tools like ChatGPT to craft highly convincing, grammatically perfect phishing emails at scale, and even to assist in writing malicious code. This lowers the barrier to entry, allowing less skilled actors to execute more sophisticated attacks.

Cyber Insurance and Ransom Payments: Friend or Foe?

The role of cyber insurance in the ransomware crisis is one of the most debated topics in cybersecurity. Once seen by some as a passive backstop that inadvertently fueled ransom payments, the insurance industry has evolved into an active and powerful force that is fundamentally reshaping how organizations prepare for and respond to attacks.

How Cyber Insurance is Changing Ransomware Response in 2026

The cyber insurance market of 2025 and 2026 is a world away from that of just a few years ago. After a period of intense volatility and skyrocketing premiums, the market entered a period of relative stability. Rates began to soften in 2024 and remained flat or even decreased for many policyholders into 2025.

This newfound stability, however, has come with a significant trade off: drastically stricter underwriting requirements. To secure coverage today, organizations can no longer simply fill out a form. They must affirmatively demonstrate a mature security posture. Insurers are now mandating a specific baseline of technical and procedural controls as a prerequisite for eligibility. While the exact requirements vary by carrier, a common set of non negotiable controls has emerged :

This shift has had a profound effect on the market. The cyber insurance industry is now, in effect, setting a de facto cybersecurity standard for businesses. The financial incentive to obtain affordable coverage has become a powerful lever for CISOs and IT leaders to justify security budgets and drive the adoption of best practices. This market driven mechanism is proving to be a highly effective way to raise the collective security posture across industries, transforming insurance from a reactive financial instrument into a proactive catalyst for cyber resilience. Meeting these stringent new requirements often involves demonstrating a mature security program, where services like penetration testing for cyber insurance eligibility become a critical part of the application process.

Does Insurance Encourage Ransom Payments? A Look at the Data

A common criticism leveled against the cyber insurance industry is that it fuels the ransomware economy by making it easy for victims to pay. The argument is that if an organization knows its ransom payment will be covered, it has less incentive to invest in strong defenses. However, the data from 2024 and 2025 paints a much more nuanced picture, suggesting that the role of insurance has become more complex and, in many ways, more beneficial to the defender.

First, it's a misconception that insurance covers 100% of the ransom. Policies come with significant retentions (deductibles), sublimits, and co insurance clauses, so victims often absorb a meaningful share of the cost from their own funds.

Second, the data shows that having insurance does not automatically lead to higher or more frequent payments. In fact, Aon, one of the world's largest insurance brokers, reported that for its clients, the average ransom payment amount declined by a staggering 77% in 2024, even as the number of ransomware claims increased. This indicates that the involvement of experienced breach coaches and negotiators, who are provided as part of the insurance policy, is leading to better outcomes for victims. These experts are skilled at managing crises and negotiating with attackers, often resulting in significantly lower payouts. Coalition, a leading cyber insurer, reported that its incident response team was able to negotiate ransom payments down by an average of 60%.

Payments that are made can still be large. BakerHostetler's 2026 Data Security Incident Response Report, based on incidents it handled in 2025, found the average ransom paid rose to $682,702.

Finally, insurers are actively creating policies that incentivize good security behavior and rapid response, since prompt reporting dramatically increases the chances of containing an incident or recovering stolen money. Rather than simply encouraging payments, the modern cyber insurance market is rewarding preparedness and resilience.

Building a Resilient Defense: A Framework for Action

Understanding the statistics and trends is only the first step. The ultimate goal is to translate that knowledge into a robust defensive strategy that can withstand the sophisticated and multifaceted threats of 2026. For UK organizations preparing for ransomware-driven extortion risk, building resilience requires a strategic approach grounded in authoritative frameworks and a practical focus on the controls that stop the most common threats.

Key Defensive Principles from NIST and CISA

Rather than chasing every new threat, a durable security strategy is built on established, risk based frameworks from trusted authorities like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and CISA.

The CSRC provides a comprehensive roadmap for organizations to manage ransomware risk. It is built upon the widely adopted NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and organizes security objectives into six core functions: Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. By using this profile, an organization can gauge its readiness, identify gaps in its defenses, and prioritize improvements based on a strategic understanding of its unique risks, rather than reacting tactically to every new headline.

CISA's ongoing initiative provides more tactical, immediate guidance based on real world incident investigations. Across dozens of joint advisories issued with the FBI and international partners, a consistent set of critical mitigations emerges as the most effective defenses against the vast majority of ransomware attacks :

  1. Implement Phishing Resistant Multi Factor Authentication (MFA): This is consistently cited as the single most critical control for preventing attacks that rely on stolen credentials.
  2. Maintain Offline, Encrypted, and Tested Backups: Backups must be isolated from the primary network to prevent attackers from deleting them. They must also be tested regularly to ensure they are viable for recovery.
  3. Prioritize Patching of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEVs): Focus patching efforts on the vulnerabilities that attackers are actively using in the wild, as cataloged in CISA's KEV list.
  4. Segment Networks: Proper network segmentation contains a breach to a small area, preventing an attacker from moving laterally from a compromised workstation to critical servers and data stores.
  5. Develop, Maintain, and Test an Incident Response Plan: An IR plan should be a living document that is regularly rehearsed through tabletop exercises to ensure every member of the team knows their role in a crisis.

Checklist: Hardening Your Organization Against 2026's Ransomware Threats

Translating these principles into action, here is a practical checklist for security leaders to harden their organizations against the specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed in 2025 and 2026.

  1. Secure Your Identities, Not Just Your Perimeter.
    • Enforce phishing resistant MFA (such as FIDO2/WebAuthn) for all users, especially for remote access, cloud services, and privileged accounts.
    • Lock down your IT help desk. Implement strict verification procedures for all password and MFA reset requests to defend against the social engineering tactics used by groups like Scattered Spider. Train help desk staff to recognize and escalate suspicious requests.
  2. Actively Manage and Reduce Your Attack Surface.
    • Go beyond basic vulnerability scanning by using professional penetration testing to validate exploitable attack paths, and red team exercises to confirm your detection would catch an intruder before encryption starts. Implement an aggressive patch management program that prioritizes the vulnerabilities listed in CISA's KEV catalog.
    • For U.S. organizations reducing ransomware exposure, regular in-depth penetration tests across external networks, internal networks, web applications, and cloud environments can uncover hidden risks that automated scanners miss. Static, annual tests are no longer sufficient; organizations must understand why continuous penetration testing matters to keep pace with evolving threats.
  3. Make Your Backups Indestructible.
    • Follow the 3 2 1 rule: three copies of your data, on two different media types, with one copy stored offline or in immutable cloud storage.
    • Assume attackers will target your backups. Ensure that access to backup administration consoles is protected with the highest levels of security, including MFA and privileged access management.
    • Regularly test your ability to restore from backups. A backup that has never been tested is not a reliable backup.
  4. Contain the Blast Radius with Network Segmentation.
    • Implement logical network segmentation to prevent uncontrolled lateral movement. A ransomware infection on a user's laptop should not be able to spread to your domain controllers or critical database servers.
    • Apply the principle of least privilege. Users and systems should only have access to the data and resources that are absolutely necessary for their function.
  5. Rehearse for a Crisis Before It Happens.
    • Your incident response plan should not be a document that gathers dust on a shelf. Conduct regular tabletop exercises with your leadership team, IT staff, legal counsel, and communications team.
    • Ensure your exercises simulate modern, realistic scenarios, including double extortion where you must deal with both system encryption and a data leak threat. The goal is to build muscle memory so that your team can execute flawlessly under pressure.

Are We Winning the War on Ransomware?

Only partly. Total ransomware payments are falling: Chainalysis initially estimated a 35% drop in 2024 (a figure it has since revised) and a further decline of about 8% in 2025. But for targeted organizations the threat is more severe, with rising median payouts and highly targeted social engineering. Defenders are beating commoditized ransomware, not elite attackers.

The ransomware landscape of 2026 presents a stark paradox. By one measure, the total amount of money flowing into criminal coffers, it appears defenders are gaining ground. Chainalysis initially estimated a 35% drop in global payments in 2024 (a figure it has since revised), followed by a further decline of about 8% in 2025. That decline is a significant victory and a direct result of improved resilience and aggressive law enforcement action. Yet, for the organizations that still find themselves in the crosshairs, the threat has never been more severe. Rising median payouts, highly targeted social engineering, and the specter of catastrophic operational disruption from attacks on core infrastructure paint a much darker picture.

So, are we winning? The answer is a qualified "yes," but the nature of the war has changed. We are winning the battle against the commoditized, high volume ransomware of the past. We are losing ground in the new, more focused fight against elite attackers targeting our most critical and valuable enterprises.

The key takeaway from the data is this: resilience is the new metric for success. The organizations that will thrive in this environment are not those that believe they can prevent every attack, but those that have built the capacity to withstand an attack, restore operations from trusted backups, and confidently refuse to pay the ransom. This is the strategy that starves the criminal ecosystem of its profits and ultimately breaks its business model. The path forward is not about finding a single silver bullet technology, but about the disciplined, continuous process of hardening defenses, planning for failure, and fostering a culture of security that can endure the inevitable crisis.

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Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) About Ransomware Payouts

1. What is the average ransomware payment in 2025?

It depends on the dataset. Chainalysis estimates the median ransom paid in 2025 was $59,556, up 368% from $12,738 in 2024, and Verizon's 2026 DBIR puts the median at $139,875. Incident response firm Coveware, whose clients skew larger, reported an average payment of $1,025,278 and a median of $400,000 in Q3 2026. Sophos's 2026 survey of 2,158 respondents across 17 countries puts the median payment at $769,000, down from $1 million a year earlier.

2. Are companies paying ransoms more or less often now?

Significantly less often. Coveware reported a payment rate of about 20% in Q4 2025, a record at the time (it reported a further record low in Q2 2026), down from 25% in Q4 2024, and Chainalysis estimates only about 28% of victims paid in 2025, potentially an all-time low. Verizon's 2026 DBIR found 69% of ransomware victims did not pay. This is primarily due to organizations having better, more reliable backups and a growing distrust that attackers will honor their promises.

3. Which industry pays the most in ransoms?

In Sophos's 2025 sector data, financial services had the highest payment rate, with 67% of victims paying, and one of the highest median payments ($2.1 million), while state and local government reported the highest median payment ($2.5 million). In Sophos's 2026 survey, state and local government had the highest payment rate (72%) and retail the lowest (32%).

4. Is it ever worth paying the ransom?

While law enforcement agencies like the FBI strongly advise against paying, the decision remains complex. Paying does not guarantee you will get your data back; in many cases, decryption tools are faulty or the data is corrupted. Furthermore, paying a ransom marks you as a willing target and may lead to repeat attacks. However, in "double extortion" scenarios where sensitive data has been stolen, some companies pay to prevent a public leak, even if they can restore systems from backups. The best strategy is to build resilience so that paying is never your only option.

5. Does paying a ransom guarantee you get your data back?

No. Paying a ransom carries significant risk. While many victims do receive a working decryption key, there is no guarantee. In some cases, the decryption tool is faulty and corrupts the data. In double extortion scenarios, where data is stolen, there is no way to verify that the attackers have actually deleted their copy of your data after you pay. The high profile Change Healthcare attack is a prime example where a $22 million ransom was paid, but it did not prevent a second group from later claiming to have the stolen data.

6. How has law enforcement action impacted ransomware gangs?

International law enforcement actions in 2024 were highly impactful. Operations like "Cronos" against the LockBit gang and the internal collapse of the ALPHV/BlackCat group successfully dismantled the two largest RaaS franchises. This has fractured the ransomware ecosystem, creating a power vacuum and sowing distrust among criminals, making it harder for any single group to dominate the market.

7. What is the difference between double and triple extortion?

Double extortion, the current standard, involves two threats:

encrypting the victim's data and stealing the victim's data and threatening to leak it publicly. Triple extortion adds a third layer of pressure, such as launching a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against the victim's public websites to cause further disruption, or directly contacting the victim's customers, shareholders, or patients to harass them into pressuring the victim to pay.

8. How is cyber insurance affecting ransomware payment decisions?

Cyber insurance is playing an increasingly complex role. Rather than just funding payments, insurers are now driving security improvements by mandating controls like MFA and EDR for coverage eligibility. When an attack occurs, the expert breach coaches and negotiators provided by the insurer often lead to better outcomes, including significantly lower ransom payments. Data from major brokers shows that their clients are paying less on average, suggesting the involvement of insurance is helping to manage, rather than inflate, ransom costs.

About the Author

Mohammed Khalil is a Cybersecurity Architect at DeepStrike, specializing in advanced penetration testing and offensive security operations. With certifications including CISSP, OSCP, and OSWE, he has led numerous red team engagements, focusing on cloud security, application vulnerabilities, and adversary emulation. His work involves dissecting complex attack chains and developing resilient defense strategies for clients in the finance, healthcare, and technology sectors, and this article draws on insights from those frontline experiences.

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